- #YEARS RUNONLY APPLESCRIPTS AVOID DETECTION FOR ZIP FILE#
- #YEARS RUNONLY APPLESCRIPTS AVOID DETECTION FOR MANUAL#
- #YEARS RUNONLY APPLESCRIPTS AVOID DETECTION FOR DOWNLOAD#
Status fish-path on Linux-based platforms could print the path with a “ (deleted)” suffix (such as /usr/bin/fish (deleted)), which is now removed ( #9019).Ĭancelling an initial command (from fish’s -init-command option) with Control- C no longer prevents configuration scripts from running ( #9024). On terminals that emit a CSI u sequence for Shift- Space, fish inserts a space instead of printing an error. This release also fixes a number of problems identified in fish 3.5.0.Ĭompleting git blame or git -C works correctly ( #9053). The error message when launching a command that is built for the wrong architecture on macOS is more helpful ( #9052). History merge when in private mode is now an error, rather than wiping out other sessions’ history ( #9050). Printf returns a better error when used with arguments interpreted as octal numbers ( #9035). This release of fish introduces the following small enhancements:Ĭursor shaping for Vi mode is enabled by default in tmux, and will be used if the outer terminal is capable ( #8981). Hxxp://ondayoncom:8080/ondayon.Release notes ¶ fish 3.5.1 (released July 20, 2022) ¶ And for deeper analysis, the second and third stages are visible and available from the VMRay Analyzer Report.Ĭom.apple.4V.plist df550039acad9e637c7c3ec2a629abf8b3f35faca18e58d447f490cf23f114e8
#YEARS RUNONLY APPLESCRIPTS AVOID DETECTION FOR MANUAL#
Within 2 minutes of analysis time, analysts can see a majority of the sample’s behavior, compared to hours of manual reverse engineering. Running the sample in VMRay gives analysts an immediate view into the key behaviors, characteristics, and IOCs. This file type won’t have a problem running on a victim’s machine but it is difficult for security teams to analyze because of the inherent obfuscation and limited tooling available. In addition, the second stage uses the system tool “caffeinate” to prevent the machine from going to sleep while the first stage will continuously query the running processes for common AV programs using the ps command: sh -c ps ax | grep -E '360|Keeper|MacMgr|Lemon|Malware|Avast|Avira|CleanMyMac' | grep -v grep | awk ''Īll of these actions are performed using sub-processes so they can be observed in the process graph and process overview.Īs we can see, this sample uses a different kind of evasion, using a rather uncommon file type, a compiled AppleScript, disguised as a PLIST file.
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The third stage is a zip file containing two dynamic libraries (dylibs) and finally a Mach-O binary, again disguised as a PLIST which can be clearly seen in the Files Tab.
Write the mining configuration (pools.txt, config.txt, cpu.txt).
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Download and extract the third stage mining payload.The second stage is again executed using “osascript” and has two main tasks: All downloads are performed using curl which is clearly visible in the Behavior Tab.
The second stage is another compiled AppleScript stored at ~/Library/11.png. The second one might be a fallback or used by another variant of the family. Interestingly, there are two URLs that were returned. The first request to budaybu100001com:8080 returns the second-stage URL embedded in the string “-=-=-=” as a marker. The Network Tab shows multiple C2 connections. Now we can dig deeper into each of these characteristics. From the Overview Tab, we can see the main behaviors of the sample including network connectivity, file dropping behavior, and system information gathering. Straight away, we see that a number of VMRay Threat Identifier (VTI) rules hit and the sample is classified as malicious. The “com.apple.4V.plist” file is placed in ~/Library/LaunchAgents by the original dropper and disguised as a Property list configuration file (PLIST) while it is in fact a compiled AppleScript. Note, at the time of analysis this sample of OSAMiner had a 2/60 detection rate on VirusTotal.
In this Malware Analysis Spotlight, we will showcase the key behaviors identified during the dynamic analysis. We analyzed one of the latest samples “ com.apple.4V.plist” using VMRay Analyzer. In 2020, the SentinelLabs Team discovered that the malware authors were evolving their evasion techniques, adding more complexity by embedding one run-only AppleScript inside another. The authors of macOS.OSAMiner used run-only AppleScripts which made attempts at further analysis more difficult. This week the team at SentinelLabs released an in-depth analysis of macOS.OSAMiner, a Monero mining trojan infecting macOS users since 2015.
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